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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT MISSION IN HAITI

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in the context of Security Council resolution 1086 (1996) of 5 December 1996, by which the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) until 31 May 1997, and further to the statement in paragraph 32 of my report of 24 March 1997 (S/1997/244) on the basis of which the mandate of UNSMIH was further extended, for the final time, until 31 July 1997.

2. As the Security Council was informed on 30 June 1997, the present report takes into account in particular, the consultations held by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Bernard Miyet, during his visit to Haiti between 10 and 13 July 1997. The report is also based on my Special Representative's earlier discussions with the Government of Haiti and on the views of the group of "Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti".

II. POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION

3. Since my report of 24 March, a number of disquieting developments have created additional uncertainty in Haiti, placing in bold relief the fragility of the country's transition to democracy. On 9 June, Prime Minister Rosny Smarth announced the resignation of his Government, saying that he had been hamstrung by tensions within the ruling coalition and lamenting, in particular, certain developments surrounding recent elections. On 26 March, Prime Minister Smarth had been called before the Chamber of Deputies to answer questions in a formal interpellation of his Government, followed by a no-confidence motion which was defeated by a majority led by his party, the Lavalas Political Organization (OPL). In the aftermath, however, the Government failed to build on this victory. In resigning, Mr. Smarth noted continued criticism by some sectors which had not accepted the Parliament's decision and wanted to force the Government to "resign under the pressure of the street".

4. On 6 April, the first round of elections for one third of the Senate and two seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the election of thousands of members of local assemblies were held without major incident, although some political

activists had engaged in heavy-handed, intimidating tactics reminiscent of earlier regimes. Overall, less than 10 per cent of the electorate are believed to have cast ballots, but no firm statistics are available. This low turnout is indicative of the level of disillusionment with the process and impatience with the lack of tangible results from the return to constitutional rule.

5. After the polling, the fairness of the elections was questioned. In a letter to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) dated 7 May, the Electoral Observer Mission of the Organization of American States (OAS-EOM), which is monitoring the process at the request of the Government, cited irregularities and "attempts to manipulate the results" in some jurisdictions. OAS-EOM mentioned the use of incomplete, handwritten lists of voters, unsatisfactory counting procedures and voter turnout approaching or even exceeding 100 per cent in some places. In a communiqué dated 27 May OAS-EOM publicly lamented "numerous irregularities, procedural shortcomings and controversies which have tarnished the integrity" of the process.

6. Of particular concern was the decision by CEP not to include blank ballots in the counting of the absolute majority. This served to hand outright victories to two Senate candidates for the Fanmi Lavalas, the political party recently founded by former President Aristide. One of them, a former police adviser to President Aristide who had failed to be ratified by the Senate as Chief of Police in late 1995, was declared elected in the South-east Département with 50.13 per cent of the vote. This issue caused a stand-off between the two main Lavalas political parties, the Fanmi Lavalas, which backed the CEP stance, and the OPL. On 8 May, the Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution asking CEP to refrain from publishing final results from the first round until Parliament could agree on an interpretation of the disputed law. The Council, which is an independent body, did not comply with the resolution, nor did it heed the OAS-EOM legal opinion that articles 108 and 109 of the electoral law clearly provide that blank ballots should be included in the count. Moreover, the Council did not answer formally the petitions of the candidates who were objecting to the results. This led the OPL to announce that it would not participate in the second round unless the results of the first round were re-examined and corrective measures taken.

7. Further disquiet has been caused by the CEP decision not to sanction some electoral officials in areas with the most irregularities, but to transfer them to other areas. In response to these transfers, the Open Gate Party (PLB) also withdrew from the race just days before the date set for the second round, citing its lack of confidence in the Council.

8. Attempts by the international community to help the two sides find common ground have floundered. After the withdrawal of two of three participating parties, the second round was postponed for the second time and it has not been rescheduled. Both the OPL and the PLB continue to ask for a number of remedial measures, including the replacement of CEP. Meanwhile, the existing CEP is attempting to complete the local assembly elections. Complementary local elections were held on 6 July. According to OAS-EOM, these elections, which were announced just five days in advance, were marred by many of the same problems as those in April. Participation was extremely low and, in some places, there were indications of ballot-stuffing.

9. With respect to security, the situation since my last report has been characterized by continuing unrest, largely as a result of discontent over the country's economic situation and lack of improvement in living conditions, as well as factionalism within the ruling Lavalas movement. There were many demonstrations, blockades and incidents of violence, some of which were related to the elections. The PLB candidate for the Senate for the West Département was the target of several attacks.

10. In-fighting within the Lavalas movement slowed down government operations and hindered progress in the country's transition to democracy, as well as in the economic reforms on which the release of foreign assistance is largely conditioned. In-fighting has also further eroded public confidence in the capacity of the authorities to solve the serious problems facing Haiti. In the eyes of many Haitians, the State is still viewed as ineffective, corrupt and unresponsive to their concerns. This perception has been confirmed by the repeated failure of Parliament to gather a quorum, which has impeded the adoption of key legislation. It is noteworthy that the 1996-1997 budget was passed on 6 May, over seven months into the fiscal year, resulting in the loss of significant foreign aid.

11. The international community itself has now come under attack and is being blamed for the country's continuing difficulties. Some popular organizations have publicly opposed what they term a "foreign occupation". Recently, one of them called for armed struggle to "liberate" the country. While these are likely the views of a vocal minority, deep-seated nationalistic sentiments are widely shared, including by those who favour the continuation of an international presence. Calls for the departure of the "occupiers" made by some "popular organizations" have been echoed by a few politicians from both the ruling Lavalas movement and the opposition, but such calls have not been supported by the many interlocutors Under-Secretary-General Miyet met in Haiti. At the same time, the benefits that the country derives from the international presence have not been publicly explained.

12. Incidents related to the political rivalries within the ruling Lavalas movement and to growing frustrations over deteriorating living conditions have posed greater demands on the Haitian National Police (HNP), which by and large has performed well. In May, public school teachers walked out to demand payment of salary arrears and an 80 per cent pay increase. The strike led to student demonstrations and street fighting, which caused severe disruption for two days in parts of the capital. The speed with which the violent protests spread and became the focus for general discontent indicates the volatility of the situation, though the infiltration of agents provocateurs cannot be ruled out.

13. The increased circulation of weapons in Haitian society and new and more sophisticated forms of organized crime are also proving a formidable challenge to the fledgling police force. Increasing illegal traffic, particularly in drugs and vehicles, is a growing concern in need of urgent attention. As HNP becomes more effective in combating this traffic, the potential for violent confrontation is likely to increase, as crime rings will fight to maintain control. Gang warfare, particularly in the dense urban slum of Cité Soleil, has also taxed the ability of HNP ability to respond forcefully within the confines of the rule of law and respect for the rights of suspects. Police officers

suffer frequent attacks, often by armed individuals. Disappointed that the justice system is not keeping pace with developments, some of them have on occasion taken matters into their own hands.

14. Despite an agreement between the Governments of Haiti and the neighbouring Dominican Republic, forced repatriations of undocumented Haitians from the Dominican Republic have continued, though at a much slower pace. Through its offices in Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been working with the two Governments on the issue. The immigration and repatriation of Haitians remain a point of contention between the two countries, and the border area is the site of frequent incidents, owing in part to the heavy traffic in contraband.

III. DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT MISSION IN HAITI

15. In extending the mandate of UNSMIH until 31 May and, subsequently, until 31 July 1997, the Security Council endorsed my recommendation to maintain the Mission's authorized strength of 300 civilian police and 500 troops. As the Council is aware, in addition to that authorized strength, the UNSMIH military element includes 800 personnel from Canada and Pakistan whose activities are financed exclusively by voluntary contributions from Canada and the United States of America. The civilian police element of the mission currently numbers 225 officers from eight countries. The composition and strength of both elements is set out in the annex to the present report.

16. The UNSMIH military element continues to be deployed exclusively in the city of Port-au-Prince, which it patrols on a 24-hour basis, and to undertake the tasks mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 1063 (1996) and outlined in my predecessor's report of 12 November 1996 (S/1996/813/Add.1, paras. 6-8). During the reporting period, the mission's helicopters played a critical role on several occasions, both in ensuring the timely arrival of HNP crowd-control units - known as Compagnies d'intervention et de maintien de l'ordre (CIMOs) - at trouble spots around the country and in delivering voting material required for the senatorial and local elections. In addition, members of the military element worked with the staff of CEP and the technical assistance team of UNDP to plan the logistical and operational support for the first round of elections. UNSMIH military personnel continue to provide protection at the National Palace and at the residence of former President Aristide.

17. Members of the UNSMIH civilian police element are deployed in 10 detachments in the provinces and 5 in Port-au-Prince and they continue to accompany HNP officers in their day-to-day activities. For the last five months, a team of three young HNP officers has been receiving training in civic education and community policing at UNSMIH headquarters. The team is in the process of collecting information around the country on experience with community policing, with a view to developing a country-wide police training programme. The central training unit of the Mission's civilian police element continues to oversee instruction through its programme de formation continue, which of late has focused on conflict resolution, marksmanship, human rights and

police work, driving, immigration and narcotics. The civilian police element has also conducted refresher courses for Palace guards and it has trained 186 HNP officers to patrol the border.

18. In light of recent disturbances in the country, UNSMIH has worked intensively to strengthen the HNP crowd-control and rapid-intervention capabilities. To this end, simulation exercises have been conducted in Cap Haïtien and additional exercises are planned for other urban centres to provide the CIMO units with much-needed on-the-ground training. The Mission's police element has also continued to work closely with the HNP Directorate General in redeploying the force according to population density and patterns of criminal behaviour, but progress has been slow. The Mission's work with HNP and its collaboration with donors continue to benefit from its monthly meetings, chaired by President Préval, with the Directorate General, key government members, bilateral donors, UNDP and the Joint Organization of African States (OAS)/United Nations International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). While the civilian police element is now deployed in fewer locations, its presence remains critical in filling gaps in the HNP chain of command and in the force's transportation and communications capacity.

IV. HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE

19. In his report of 12 November 1996 (S/1996/813/Add.1, para. 20), my predecessor pointed out that establishing a new police force is a complex, difficult and lengthy task, and he listed several elements which should be considered to help measure the results achieved. As the mandate of UNSMIH draws to a close, examining HNP against these criteria has proved useful in establishing priorities and identifying the force's future needs. A study conducted by UNSMIH in May of this year has shown significant advances, but has also highlighted a number of serious shortcomings that are particularly worrying as the end of the mandate draws near. For example, while there has been some progress in filling out the force's chain of command, the study has shown that there was no movement between the months of March and May. As this report is being prepared, HNP still lacks 49 of the senior officers known as commissaires, 162 inspecteurs and 292 of the upper-level officers known as agents 3 and 4. The civilian police element of UNSMIH has been working with the HNP leadership to help select 48 members of the existing force who will assume senior positions after undergoing training at the Academy. Additional officers will be recruited later. As mentioned above, a major redeployment of the force is being implemented and is now well advanced. As regards the capacity of HNP to manage its human and material resources, the force's oversight of its personnel, vehicles supplies and infrastructure has been reviewed and found to be the weakest link in its institutional development. The situation is made more severe by the scarcity of funds available to HNP, which can ill afford the continuing loss of its equipment through theft or mismanagement. Steps have also been taken to establish regional training centres, but a standard basic curriculum for all levels of agents has yet to be established. Work continues on promoting the community policing concept, which is well established in five of nine départements. Progress has also been made in installing a telecommunications system. All regional headquarters are now connected to Port-au-Prince and 32 of the 39 commissariats are connected to the capital.

However, very little improvement has been recorded in the capacity of HNP to maintain records or to establish a database of its own staff and equipment.

20. The UNSMIH study also examined in detail the progress achieved by the country's nine command centres (centres de renseignement et d'opérations) in each of the départements, as well as by the main centre at HNP headquarters. As regards the latter, it was found to be fully equipped and its staff trained and, with the necessary communications equipment installed, it is now almost fully operational. By contrast, wide disparities were found among the nine regional centres, which were frequently without telephone lines. Concerning HNP specialized units, which were examined for their development, level of training, personnel and equipment, the crowd-control units were found to have met more than half of their goals. With units in most major cities, the CIMOs have performed well when called upon to respond to disturbances. For example, CIMO units, along with other personnel, handled well a recent popular concert which drew large crowds in downtown Port-au-Prince; however, problems were noted in their handling of the teachers' strike mentioned in paragraph 12 above. The investigative department (police judiciaire) continues to lag. While some of its units are well equipped and their personnel adequately trained, it has only a limited number of fully operational units, and the lack of a criminal investigative capacity continues to be an impediment to the administration of justice. Some advance was noted in the traffic-control unit, which has now attained almost half of its goals.

21. The Inspector-General's office continues to be seized with a large number of allegations of breaches of proper police procedures, abuses of authority and human rights violations. In this regard, the office has moved quickly to investigate recent allegations of "extra-judicial" executions by HNP, and 18 officers, including one commissaire, were dismissed during the reporting period. This brought to over 100, including 12 commissaires, the number of dismissals since the establishment of the force in June 1995. However, the announced corps-wide performance survey intended to rid the force of those elements which do not adhere to its approach to public security has yet to be completed and is now long overdue. This review is essential if the credibility of HNP is to be established in the eyes of the population. It is also necessary to transfer to the courts without further delay the cases of those individuals who have committed prosecutable acts. In that regard, it should be noted that the poor state of the judicial system continues to be a serious obstacle to HNP effectiveness.

V. JUSTICE SYSTEM

22. As my predecessor and I have repeatedly stated, most recently in my report to the General Assembly on the situation of democracy and human rights in Haiti (A/51/935), Haiti's justice sector is ineffectual, it is not keeping pace with developments in the public security sector and is in need of a total overhaul. As a result of this situation, both the police and the population at large are becoming increasingly frustrated, each occasionally taking matters into its own hands in the face of the system's inability to administer justice. The number of cases of vigilante justice remains high: 66 since the beginning of 1997. HNP has been known either to let detainees go or to administer its own brand of

summary justice in the belief that the courts will not professionally process a case. HNP members detained in connection with crimes are not routinely turned over to the courts, a fact which impacts negatively on the efforts by the hierarchy to penalize wrongdoing. In the latest period of violence and unrest, the number of incidents involving abuse of authority and human rights violations by HNP rose, despite disciplinary measures by the Inspector-General. While prison administration has improved, there have recently been some examples of failure to take adequate steps to ensure the welfare of detainees, as cases in Hinche and Arcahaie illustrate.

23. Canada, France and the United States of America are sponsoring initiatives designed to promote judicial reform, often in close collaboration with MICIVIH. Yet, major structural and leadership weaknesses throughout the justice sector continue to impede the proper use of the support being offered. Months after its establishment, a commission named to craft a global strategy for judicial reform is still striving to develop a coherent approach. Meanwhile, a bill on judicial reform introduced in September 1996, was passed by the Senate on 10 July 1997 and is now before the Chamber of Deputies. The judicial training school remains under-utilized, although courses are expected to resume in the fall. There is general agreement on the urgent necessity to professionalize and modernize Haiti's justice sector. It is, however, a long-term undertaking that requires consensus and continuity.

VI. DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

24. The decision-making process and the execution capacity of the Government have been further weakened by the splintering of the Lavalas movement. As a consequence, several fully financed projects and programmes have not yet been initiated, and large amounts in external financing remain available. However, if the considerable decline in disbursements experienced in 1996 is not reversed in 1997, the economic recovery, which could be stimulated through public investment, will be delayed yet again, probably until next year.

25. Even though the rate of inflation has declined to slightly above 10 per cent and the exchange rate has been comparatively stable, private investors remain cautious. Only in the service and residential construction sectors are private investments increasing. These, however, are not sufficient to provide impetus to the economy as a whole. Unemployment and underemployment are believed to hover around 70 per cent, and new employment opportunities remain very limited. With some 70,000 Haitians joining the labour force each year, family incomes stagnating and prices of basic commodities rising, social pressure continues to increase steadily, as does the resulting potential for conflict.

26. Development cooperation efforts remain strong. Despite the slow-down in disbursements noted above, there have been substantial additional commitments by international financial institutions and by multilateral and bilateral donors. The execution of UNDP projects, which increased fourfold in 1995 following the end of economic sanctions, increased further in 1996 and is expected to reach a record level this year. Likewise, commitments are at an all-time high, totalling more than US$ 20 million in 1997. While UNDP focuses on governance,

socio-economic and environmental projects and programmes still absorb about half of its financial resources. The majority of such programmes are executed by, or in close collaboration with, agencies of the United Nations system and the Bretton Woods institutions. At the field level, coordination of the activities of the United Nations system, in which the Bretton Woods institutions and the International Organization for Migration regularly participate, has been enhanced by the combining of the functions of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Resident Coordinator of UNDP. Moreover, the active participation of my Special Representative in the monthly coordination meetings of the United Nations system has strengthened inter-agency cooperation even further.

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

27. With the support of the international community, including the United Nations, Haiti has taken significant strides forward. For the first time in its history, a peaceful hand-over of power between two democratically elected presidents took place in February 1996, when President Préval assumed office; several election rounds have been held without violent incidents; and the fledgling police force, which is making progress towards the day when it can alone assume public security functions, is already having a positive effect on security in the country: compared to 1995, the average number of homicides committed monthly in 1997 has decreased. Furthermore, the Haitians have clearly rejected arbitrariness and authoritarianism. The years of dictatorship are over and the former military have now been weakened to a point where their return to power appears highly unlikely.

28. Haiti continues to face daunting political and economic challenges. In the short term, a new cabinet must be formed and the electoral crisis overcome to allow Parliament and local assemblies to function effectively. Reforms needed to strengthen democratic institutions, generate economic growth and create jobs require a basic consensus among Haitians that has yet to be built.

29. In the long run, sustainable development will not be achieved without significant international assistance, based on a widely supported action plan. To secure and harness this assistance, UNDP has sponsored the "Haiti 2012" initiative, by which some 30 objectives to be attained in 15 years in the economic, social and institutional sectors are soon to be identified by 250 Haitian participants. These objectives and the ensuing framework should provide direction for national and international development efforts. I hope that this initiative, which would benefit from a broader base of support, will meet with success.

30. UNDP has begun strengthening its office in Haiti in order to support national development efforts better and to be ready to assume additional institution-building tasks presently carried out by UNSMIH and MICIVIH. It has recently signed an agreement with the Government of Haiti that aims to increase the absorptive capacity of the administration by providing additional expertise in the design and execution of development projects. With regard to technical assistance for the institutional development of HNP, transfer to UNDP of the

voluntary fund established under resolution 975 (1995) is under way. Technical assistance to judicial reform will be required over the medium and long term.

31. It will be recalled that in his report of 5 June 1996 (S/1996/416, para. 19), my predecessor stated that training of HNP in specialized fields such as criminal investigation, narcotics and crowd control was not expected to be completed before the end of 1997. Although progress has been made in the establishment of the new police force, as well as in the above-mentioned fields, it has been slow and uneven. Furthermore, some Haitians fear that the young police force might be manipulated by certain political groups, for which there is precedent. I share the view of Haiti's political leaders that, without steady and long-term support from the international community, the force might not be able to cope with serious incidents, risking deterioration in the security situation.

32. As mentioned in paragraph 11 above, in spite of sporadic demonstrations and a few calls for the withdrawal of the "occupation force", recent contacts held in Port-au-Prince by Under-Secretary-General Miyet, my Special Representative and high-level representatives of the group of "Friends of the Secretary-General" have confirmed that the UNSMIH international military presence has a stabilizing effect on Haiti, especially at this time when the country is experiencing serious political turmoil. But it is up to the Haitian authorities to dedicate their efforts and to channel their resources and time towards resolving constructively and in a timely manner the important and pressing issues that the country is facing.

33. On 24 March, I reported to the Security Council that in order to ensure the continued institutional development of the police force, the mandate of UNSMIH should be extended for a final time until 31 July 1997. In keeping with that decision, I am preparing to withdraw the Mission by the end of July. Yet, ending the United Nations presence at this time might well jeopardize the significant progress achieved by Haiti with the assistance of the international community. Therefore, I share the views expressed by President Préval in his public statement of 14 May 1997 that the full 12 months he requested in his 13 November 1996 letter to my predecessor (see S/1996/956, annex) will be necessary for HNP to be able to ensure a secure and stable environment without international support.

34. Against this background, I recommend that the Security Council examine carefully the facts given in the present report in order to decide upon the maintenance of a United Nations support of HNP for a period of four months. Were this to be agreed, the Security Council could establish a new mission to be known as the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), the mandate of which would be to support the Haitian authorities in the further professionalization of HNP. My Special Representative would continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation.

35. If the Security Council approves such a mandate, and bearing in mind that countries contributing the majority of the civilian police element are not prepared to deploy their officers without appropriate military backing, the new Mission should be composed of military and civilian police elements.

36. Mindful of the financial crisis in which the United Nations currently finds itself, as well as of the unpaid contributions to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)/UNSMIH special accounts, and conscious of the need to reduce the strength of the United Nations presence in Haiti, I recommend that the United Nations-assessed strength of the new Mission be substantially reduced - the civilian police element from 300 to 250 officers and the military element from 500 personnel to a military headquarters staff of 50.

37. In view of the progress achieved so far by UNSMIH, the primary task of the military element would be to support the activities of the United Nations civilian police, and some of its earlier tasks would be gradually discontinued. The 50 headquarters personnel would be supplemented by contingents provided by Canada and Pakistan and funded by voluntary contributions. In that regard, the Governments of Canada and the United States of America have expressed their readiness to continue to make the necessary financial contributions.

38. During the forthcoming four months, the civilian police element would gradually shift its tasks to the training of three of the HNP specialized units - crowd control, the rapid reaction force and Palace security - which are considered of distinct importance. Once reinforced, these units would considerably improve the force's effectiveness while it pursues its own development. The Mission and UNDP would also continue to prepare a technical assistance programme, which would be financed by the voluntary fund established under resolution 975 (1995). The envisaged programme aims to provide HNP with top-level law enforcement expertise over the next three years. In that regard, I wish to take this opportunity to thank those who have contributed to the fund. I also wish to reiterate my appeal to Member States to consider contributing to the fund and to do all they can to support the technical assistance programme.

39. Consultations would have to be held with the Haitian authorities regarding the status-of-forces agreement. The agreement concluded between the Government of Haiti and the United Nations regarding UNMIH and UNSMIH might be applied to the new Mission, taking into account the different mandate of the latter. The UNTMIH rules of engagement would be defined in accordance with its mandate. In keeping with normal practice, these rules will authorize the use of force in exercise of the right of self-defence, including opposing forcible attempts to impede the discharge of the Mission's mandate, bearing in mind the situation on the ground as determined by my Special Representative in consultation with the Commander of the military element of the Mission and in close cooperation with President Préval and his Government.

40. Should Security Council members agree with my recommendations, I shall submit as soon as possible, in an addendum to the present report, a statement of the financial implications of my proposals.

41. Should the Security Council authorize the deployment of UNTMIH, the expiration of the peacekeeping mandate on 30 November 1997 would not mean the termination of United Nations involvement in Haiti. Indeed, it will be important for the international community to continue to assist the activities of the Government of Haiti aimed at the strengthening of democratic institutions, as well as to maintain a strong support to the building of a professional police force. A follow-on presence in order to provide advice and

active support in the fields of public security and judicial reform, as well as in the monitoring of human rights, will be required for at least the medium term. Special attention would also have to be paid to the country's growing problem in drug trafficking, for which it might be useful to benefit from the expertise of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme. In this context, I will make further recommendations on the modalities of international assistance after 30 November 1997. The political support of the international community for these United Nations activities, which constitute peace-building in its best sense, will be essential.

42. In concluding this report, I would like to commend the troops, civilian police officers and international civilian personnel, who performed their duties under challenging circumstances. Throughout the mandate of UNSMIH, my Special Representative, Mr. Enrique ter Horst, the Force Commander, Brigadier-General Pierre Daigle and the Civilian Police Commissioner, Colonel Robert Pigeyre, have provided distinguished leadership to the Mission.

Annex

Composition and strength of UNSMIH military and civilian police elements as of 10 July 1997

Nationality	Military			Civilian police
	Operational	Headquarters	Voluntarily funded	
Algeria				14
Benin				10
Canada	422	34	300	62
France				44
India				3
Mali				38
Pakistan	25	19	500	
Togo				7
United States of America				47
Total	447	53	800	225
Grand Total	500		800	225



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